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Abstract
This paper will look at the process of transnational transfer of ideas,
beliefs and value-systems, with a special emphasis on the transfer of Islamist
ideas and ideals through the vector of  student movements and organisations
that were set up in Western Europe and North America as well as the
rise of a new generation of Islamist intellectuals in Malaysia in the late
1960s for whom the idea of  the ‘West’ was turned on its head and re-cast
in negative terms.
It begins by looking at how the ‘West’ was initially cast in positive terms
as the ideal developmental model by the first generation of post-colonial
elites in Malaysia, and how – as a result of  the crisis of  governance and
the gradual decline in popularity of the ruling political coalition – the
‘West’ was subsequently re-cast in negative terms by the Islamists of  the
1960s and 1970s who sought instead to turn Malaysia into an Islamic
society from below.
As a consequence of this dialectical confrontation between the ruling statist
elite and the nascent Islamist opposition in Malaysia, the idea of the
‘West’ has remained as the central constitutive Other to Islam and
Muslim identity, and this would suggest that the Islamist project of  the
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1970s to the present remains locked in a mode of oppositional dialectics
that nonetheless requires the presence of  the ‘West’ as its constitutive Other,
be it in positive or negative terms.
Keywords: Malaysian intellectuals, politics, Islamic activism, western
            status
A. Introduction: Faith, Reason and Education – How ‘Western’
Education led to the re-birth of  Islamic activism in Malaysia
in the 1970s
‘Modern social science… asserted that religion would fade,
then disappear, with the triumph of science and rationalism.
But religion has expanded explosively, stimulated as much by
secular global processes- migration, multinational capital, the
media revolution- as by proselytising activity. Contrary to
expectations, its expansion has been an answer to and driven
by modernity. In response to the deracination and threats of
cultural extinction associated with modernising processes,
religious experience seeks to restore meaning to life’.
Sussane Hoeber Rudolph,
Religion, States and Transnational Civil Society.1
This paper will look at how the experience of Malaysian-Muslim
university and college students in Europe from the late 1960s to the
early 1990s helped to form their own understanding of  Islam and
consciousness as Muslim subjects. 2  The paper begins by arguing that
–––––––––––––––––
1 Susanne Hoeber Rudoplh, “Religion, States and Transnational Civil Society”,
in Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.), Transnational Religion and Nation
States, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 1.
2 I will not be discussing the process of Islamisation in Malaysia and the rest of
the Malay world as there already exists a vast body of scholarly material that has looked
into the subject. For further elucidation and analysis on the topic, one could turn to the
following sources: on Islam’s early arrival in the Malay world, see: S. Q. Fatimi, Islam
Comes to Malaysia, (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute (MSRI), 1963);
S. Hussein Alatas, “On the Need for a Historical Study of Malaysian Islamisation’,
Journal of  Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 4 No. 3, Singapore, March 1963; S. Naguib Al-
Attas, Preliminary Statement on a General Theory of  the Islamization of  the Malay-Indonesian
Archipelago, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1963) and  Russell Jones,
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009 M/1430 H 3
The Transnational Debate on the Status of  the “West”
the experience of the Malay-Muslim diaspora in Europe at this time
was neither new nor unique: after all, Malay-Muslims have been part
of a heterodox and internally differentiated global Muslim community
for centuries, and it could never be said that travel to Europe was a
radically different experience compared to their travels elsewhere.
Neither Islam nor the wheel were re-invented through this sudden
increase in the level of contact and migration between these two social
spheres and there has been no radical paradigm shift in terms of  the
actual power differentials between North and South, East and West.
However, I am not claiming that the contact with the West and
Europe in particular has been inconsequential or that it has left no
traces either. But what needs to be qualified and examined further are
the specific socio-political and historical circumstances of their travels
and experiences in the West at that particular juncture of  Malay-Muslim
history. The focus will be primarily on the experiences of  Malaysian
Muslim students who were travelling to Europe during that period.
While other similar studies have been conducted before3 on groups of
–––––––––––––––––
“Ten Conversion Myths from Indonesia”, in Nehemia Levtzion (ed.), Conversion to
Islam, (London: Holmes and Meier, 1979). On the topic of contemporary developments
in the Malay-Muslim world, see: Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, (Petaling
Jaya: Fajar Bakti Press, 1987); Sharon Siddique, “Conceptualising Contemporary Islam:
Religion of  Ideology?”, in Ahmad Ibrahim, Yasmin Hussain and Sharon Siddique
(eds.), Readings on Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Institute for Southeast
Asian Studies (ISEAS), 1985); Judith Nagata, The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam,
(Vancouver: University of  British Columbia Press, 1984). For a comparative approach
which situates Islamic resurgence in Malaysia within a global context, see: Chandra
Muzaffar, “Islamic Resurgence: A Global View”, in Taufik Abdullah and Sharon
Siddique (eds.), Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Institute for Southeast
Asian Studies (ISEAS), 1986). For an insight into the ideas and philosophy of one of
the foremost Islamists and defenders of Islamisation in Malaysia, see: Syed Naquib al-
Attas, Islam and Secularism, (Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 1978).
3 Richard T. Antoun, “Sojourners Abroad: Migration for Higher Education in
a Post Peasant Muslim Society”, in Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds), Islam,
Globalisation and Postmodernity, (London: Routledge Press, 1994). Antoun’s study on
the patterns of student migration from Jordan to Europe, though interesting and
highly informative, fails to explain the discursive dynamics at work in the process of
intercultural contact. His interviews with Jordanian students studying in Europe and
North America reveal their own ambivalent attitude towards the West as well as their
own contested understandings of  their self  identity.
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students from other countries, my own concern is to examine how and
why the image of Europe began to change in the minds of this specific
constituency. The paper goes on to argue that the European experience
presented the Malay-Muslim students with a host of hitherto unforeseen
and unexpected challenges, which were met (both individually and
collectively) via the formation of  stronger communal bonds and
networks among the Muslim students who were living and studying
there at the time.
It was in Europe that the Malay-Muslim students of the 60s-80s
came to understand and appreciate their own sense of identity and
difference vis-à-vis the host community (which was not always
hospitable), that in turn generated new awareness and expectations of
themselves as Muslims living in a world where Islam was not only not
the universal standard by which all norms were set but also no longer
a potent and dominant cultural, political and economic force. Europe,
in this sense, provided the Malay-Muslim students with a new socio-
political setting and discursive arena which forced them to reconfigure
new understandings in order to help them explain the condition of the
Muslim community at large. These new understandings and
expectations were then brought home by the Malaysian students
themselves, and paved the way for the further development of Malay-
Muslim politics in Malaysia to come. The paper will therefore end with
some tentative conclusions about the state of Muslim affairs in
Malaysia and Europe at the present and what might come in the near
future.
B. This Thing called ‘The West’: Shock of  the New or just
Continuity?
‘It was in the West that I learned what it means to be a true
Muslim. Never have I felt as free to be a real Muslim as I did
when I was living in Europe. My experience of studying in
England helped me to become a better Muslim when I
returned home.’
Comments such as these were typical among the Malay-Muslim
students who returned to Malaysia in the 1970s and 1980s after their
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sojourn in Europe and the United States. They have been recorded
and documented at length by a number of Malaysian scholars who
have studied the complex process of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia
which began in the 1970s4, and such statements remain commonplace
among new returnees to Malaysia up till today.
While a number of scholars have cited such statements as proof
of the ‘new’ Islamic consciousness among Malay-Muslims in Malaysia,
it might be useful to point out that the same was said by that other
globe-trotting Islamist intellectual and activist, Jamaluddin al-Afghani,
more than a century before. Since the mid-19th century the West, and
Europe in particular, has been the test-bed for successive generations
of Muslim students, thinkers and activists for whom the experience of
cultural contact with the Other has led to a radical questioning of the
Self and the redefinition (and in many cases strengthening) of the
boundaries between the two.
The claim that contact with the West and the experience of  living
in the Western world have opened up new vistas and expanded the
horizons of the Muslim world must therefore be taken with a liberal
dose of salt. There have been those who have argued that a ‘redefinition’
and ‘reintellectualisation’ of Islam, Islamic discourse and Islamic
identity has been brought about thanks to advances in communications
and transport technology which have allowed Muslims to jump onto
the first jet plane they see and fly to the cultural and political centres
of Europe. The internet, which has brought the Muslim world and
Europe closer together, is also said to have played a part in this grand
reconceptualisation of  Islamic culture and civilisation. Yet all this talk
of free-flow of bodies and ideas has invariably been accompanied by
claims that the Muslim world has or is about to experience the creation
of ‘new religious and civic spheres’, characterised by ‘new thinking’
done by ‘new people’ who are part of the ‘new public’ and who utilise
the ‘new media’. Eickelman and Anderson, for instance, have argued
that ‘a new sense of public is emerging throughout Muslim-majority
–––––––––––––––––
4 See for instance Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia; Sharon
Siddique, “Conceptualising Contemporary Islam”; Judith Nagata, The Reflowering of
Malaysian Islam.
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states and Muslim communities’ thanks to ‘new and increasingly
accessible modes of communication’.5 The end result of this over-
abundant newness is, we are told, that ‘boundaries are no longer
primarily territorial’.6
But just how much of  this is really new, and how do we define
newness in such cases? To claim that hybridity signifies the moment of
the post-modern in the Muslim world is somewhat passé, considering
the fact that the experience of Islam for an overwhelming majority of
Muslims for the past one and a half millennia has been marked by
imaginative re-invention and accommodation through the exercise of
creative agency and local genius anyway. If  contact with and travel to
the West is meant to represent a radical break from traditionally held
notions of geography and space in the so-called ‘Muslim consciousness’
(as if such a general essentialist category even existed), then we need
to ask ourselves if the migration of Muslims to Europe during the
mid-20th century was really a novel experience for them.
Though it could never be said that all Muslims were and are
nomadic itinerant travellers, it is safe to say that they have never been
a geographically fixed community either. Akbar Ahmed (1994) has
noted that ‘Islam explicitly encourages and even enjoins certain forms
of travel, and the movement of Muslims from one part of the world to
another, whatever the purpose, resonates with the historical foundations
of  their religion.’7 The first great movement being the Prophets hijrah
or migration from Mecca to Yathrib (Medina). Muslim history is full of
the stories of  Muslim travellers like Ibn Battuta, Ibn Khaldun, al Biruni
and Cheng Ho who travelled across the globe.
These new transport and communications technologies have
merely accelerated the processes and practices that have been there all
along. Jet planes may be faster than steamships, email faster than faxes
which were faster than the regular post, but the messages they carry
today are probably not all that radically different from what was carried
–––––––––––––––––
5 Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson, “Redefining Muslim Publics”,
in Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (eds.), New Media in the Muslim World: The
Emerging Public Sphere, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999),
p. 1.
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in the past. As Appadurai has pointed out, the present forms of
globalisation seem not that much different from the earlier ones.8
The Coordinates of Global Islam
With the arrival of Islam to the Malay world, the Malay-Muslims
were integrated into a global network of Muslim political and economic
centres and institutions of  Islamic art and learning. Conversion to Islam
did not mean that the Malays were relegated to the backyard of the
Muslim world either: It brought about considerable strategic gains and
advantages thanks to new-found access to Muslim-dominated trading
routes and transport networks. The 14th-15th century Malay-Muslim
coastal kingdom of Melacca (Melaka) became one of the most
important commercial centres in the Muslim world and as a result the
Malays felt themselves part of a global Muslim community which was
then at the height of  its powers and influence. Malay rulers like the
Sultans of Aceh, Melaka and Johor-Riau were corresponding with
European rulers and referring to the latter as their ‘brother Kings’ in
their letters.
Up the late-18th to mid-19th centuries, the traffic between the
Malay Archipelago and the rest of the Muslim world was intense.
Despite the attempts by the Western colonial powers (Britain in Malaya,
Holland in the Dutch East Indies and Spain in the Philippines) to
control the volume of trade and human traffic within and without the
Malay archipelago, it was clear that the Straits of  Melacca and the
South China Sea was still the ‘corridors’ that kept the ‘rooms’ of the
Malay homeland together. Indonesian-Malays moved and migrated with
ease throughout the archipelago and their level of contact and exposure
–––––––––––––––––
6 Ibid., p. 6.
7 Akbar S. Ahmed, “Islam in the Age of  Postmodernity”, in Akbar S.
Ahmed and Hastings Donnan (eds), Islam, Globalisation and Postmodernity, (London:
Routledge Press, 1994), p. 4.
8 See. A. Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural
Economy”, in Public Culture 2 (2), 1990, p. 5.
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to the rest of the Muslim world was also considerably high, despite the
hurdles placed before them.9
The arrival of  the Western colonial powers and the consolidation
of  Western colonial rule in the Malay Archipelago did not dampen the
spirits of the Indonesian-Malays, but further increased their
determination to push the limits of  the coloniser’s new political
geography. It was during the 19th and early 20th centuries that we see a
growing number of Indonesian-Malays travelling abroad to visit the
holy lands of Islam and to establish contact with (then) independent
Muslim political, economic and educational centres. Malay-Muslim
traders continued to travel to East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula,
Hadramaut and the ports of India to trade as they did centuries before.
The rise of  the first generation of  Malay-Muslim reformist thinkers
took place at this precise juncture in the history of  Malayan-Western
relations, and it is hardly a coincidence if all of those Malay-Muslim
reformists who were travelling abroad at that time were increasingly
concerned about the lot of the Muslim community world-wide in the
face of  growing Western militarism and expansionism.
Up to that point, the main destinations of the Indonesian-Malays
who were travelling abroad were Mecca, Cairo, Istanbul, Delhi, Deoband
and Bengal. By then there were already a number of Indonesian-Malay
ulama and resident scholars teaching at the educational institutions in
Mecca like Sheikh Umar al-Sumbawi, Sheikh Uthman al-Sarawaki and
Sheikh Ahmad Khatib of Minangkabau. Apart from Mecca, Cairo in
particular was a magnet that attracted successive generations of Malay-
Muslim ulama, intellectuals and scholars, being as it was at that time
the centre for radical Islamist reformist-modernist thinking and the
–––––––––––––––––
9 Both the British and Dutch colonial authorities attempted to divide the
Malay archipelago between themselves and to police the territories that had come under
their influence. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of  1824 effectively drew a boundary between
Peninsula Malaya and Sumatra (which today remains as part of Indonesia). But despite
these measures, the volume of human traffic between Peninsula Malaya (under British
control) and the Dutch East Indies never diminished. There was simply no way for
either colonial power to control and police the porous boundaries between their colonies-
not least for the simple reason that these boundaries were not recognised by anyone
but the colonial authorities themselves.
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home of  the famous al-Azhar university, made famous by the prominent
Egyptian Islamist scholar Muhammad Abduh. Among the more
prominent Malay-Muslim activists and scholars who travelled to Cairo
and Mecca at that time were Syed Sheikh Ahmad al-Hadi, Sheikh
Mohamad Tahir Jalaludin al-Azhari and Sheikh Muhammad Basyuni
Imran.
To sum up, it could be said that right up to the earlier half  of  the
20th century the Malay-Muslims of  the archipelago were well and truly
‘wired’ to a global Muslim community that was held together by a
complex array of  media, communications and transportation networks.
Malays in the archipelago were not only travelling abroad for education
and work, they were also receiving information and news from other
parts of the Islamic world via this highly efficient system of
communication. Thus the Malays were kept abreast of developments
in other parts of the Muslim world all the time and the Malay-Muslim
intelligentsia in particular were attentive to the latest currents of ideas,
debates and upheavals that were taking place elsewhere in the Muslim
world- such as the Balkans crisis, the Caliphate controversy, the Khilafat
movement and the question of whether Muslims should support the
axis powers or the western bloc during the years leading up to the
Second World War. What requires further interrogation is the claim
that the experience of travel to Europe in particular was different from
the experience of  travelling to other parts of  the Muslim world. Now,
that is a different story altogether:
Even in the Malay world (long thought of by Orientalist scholars
as a ‘periphery’ domain within the Muslim world) the movement of
Malay-Muslims to other parts of the globe was far from small or
diminished by the advent of  colonial rule. Nor did the arrival of  ‘new’
transport and communications technology leave the Malay-Muslims
dumbfounded. Contrary to the thesis put forward by the likes of
Gellner,10 Muslims were more than capable of dealing with advances
in technology even when they were no longer at the forefront of
technological innovation. They did not stare blankly at the huge ocean
liners that breathed smoke and fire, wondering what they were or how
–––––––––––––––––
10 Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009 M/1430 H
Farish A. Noor
10
they worked. They simply bought their tickets and sailed off to Mecca
and Cairo. But Cairo and Mecca were not the only destinations of  the
Malay-Muslims. What is equally important to note is that during the
same period (mid-19th to mid-20th century) there was also a large number
of  Malays who were travelling to the West for a number of  reasons.
British colonial rule brought about important structural and
institutional changes to the way that the Malay lands were governed.
(The same holds true for Indonesia and the Philippines which came
under Dutch and Spanish rule respectively). The poly-nuclear world
of the Malay Archipelago was systematically mapped out, demarcated,
divided and ruled by the competing colonial powers who introduced
centralised rule in one way or another. While keeping the local insurgent
forces at bay, the British, Dutch, French, Spanish and American
colonisers in Southeast Asia were also keen to accommodate and
incorporate the native rulers and traditional elite into their respective
colonial administrative frameworks. Institutions of  higher learning were
built, with the specific aim of imparting colonial (not to be confused
with Western) education to the offspring of  the local rulers and aristocrats
themselves.
Apart from the Malay Sultans, there was also a growing number
of Malay-Muslims travelling to Europe (and Britain in particular) for
the sake of education. The political realities of the time had convinced
the members of  the Malay-Muslim ruling elite that the sun of  the British
Empire was not about to set just yet. And as long as it didn’t it would
be in their own interests to send their sons to that corner of the world
to learn the ways and mores of  their uninvited colonial masters. Thus
it was that from the early to mid-20th century onwards we begin to see
a growing number of Malays (mostly from the elite strata) travelling to
Europe in order to gain entry into Western institutions of  higher
education. Among them were men like Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra
Al-Haj (who later became the first Prime Minister of  Malaysia), Tun
Abdul Razak (who became the second Prime Minister), Tengku
Razaleigh Hamzah and Datuk Harun Idris. It was in London that men
like Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Razak and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah
first met and it was there that the nucleus of  the conservative Malay-
Muslim UMNO party was formed.
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This trend remained unchallenged right up to the post-war years
of the 1940s and 1950s: While the members of the Malay-Muslim
elite and aristocracy travelled to the West to further their education,
the scions of the Malay-Muslim lower-middle classes were still being
sent to centres of learning in the Arab-Muslim world like their fathers
had done. Thus while the future leaders of  the conservative United
Malays National Organisation11 (UMNO) party were being educated
in Oxford and Cambridge, the future leaders of the Pan-Malaysian
Islamic Party12 (PAS), like Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy, Dr. Zulkiflee
–––––––––––––––––
11 The United Malay Nationalist Organisation (UMNO) was formed in 1946
after a Pan-Malayan Congress that brought together all the major Malay-Muslim political
groupings of  the country. The Congress included representatives of  the conservative,
leftist, nationalist and Islamist camps, but the leftists soon left the movement altogether.
UMNO was formed in the same year and it remains the most dominant party in
Malaysia today, with more than two and a half  million members. It was formed in 1946
as a conglomeration of  Malay nationalist organisations. UMNO’s ideological stand
remains right of  centre, with strong neofeudal and conservative-traditionalist elements
in the party’s culture. UMNO has also been at the head of  the ruling alliance which has
been in power in the country since independence was granted in 1957. At first the
Alliance (Perikatan) was made up of  UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Assembly (MCA)
and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). In 1974 the Alliance was disbanded and
replaced with the National Front (Barisan Nasional) coalition that included UMNO,
MCA, MIC and others parties such as Gerakan, PPP, SUPP, Berjasa, and even the Islamic
party PAS (which joined the coalition between 1973 to 1978).
12 The nucleus of  the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) lay in the Bureau of
Religious Affairs of  the conservative-nationalist Malay party, UMNO. By the early 1950s,
the Ulama and religious leaders within UMNO felt that the time had come for them to
break away from the nationalist organisation and form a party of their own. This was
due to the conduct and poor leadership shown by the UMNO leaders themselves like
Dato’ Onn Jaafar. In 1951, PAS was formed under the leadership of  Haji Fuad Hassan,
who was the head of the UMNO bureau of religious affairs. By 1956 the party members
felt that their party needed a new leader with greater vision and political commitment.
The radical nationalist and Islamist thinker Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy was then invited
to take over as president of  PAS at its fifth conference in December 1956. Between 1956
to 1969, the combined leadership of Dr. Burhanuddin and Dr. Zulkiflee Muhammad
(the party’s vice-president) managed to broaden the political base of  PAS and open it
up to the rest of the Muslim world. Both men were veteran activists who had studied
abroad. Dr. Burhanuddin had studied at Aligarh while Dr. Zulkiflee at al-Azhar. During
the elections of  1959, 1964 and 1969, PAS managed to do quite well and it came to
power in the state of Kelantan. In 1969 Dr. Burhanuddin passed away after being put
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Muhammad and Ustaz Yusuf  Rawa, were being educated at Aligarh,
Mecca and al-Azhar.
Up to the 1950s at least, it appeared as if the trend of parallel
education and overseas networks would remain unchallenged. But the
vicissitudes of  politics and changing perceptions of  the West (and East)
would soon change all that for good.
C. Shifting alliances and new co-ordinates: The political factors
shaping Malaysian perceptions of  Europe and the West in
general from the 1960s to the 1980s.
The twentieth century witnessed the rise and fall of a number
of Asian states and kingdoms stretching from India to China. But the
dominant notion that the Western nations were invulnerable was
shattered at the battle of  Tsushima (during the Japo-Russo war), when
the Japanese imperial navy destroyed the entire Russian Pacific fleet.
The effect of  Japan’s victory was felt throughout Asia and the Muslim
world. Suddenly it appeared that the ‘white races’ of Europe were not
invincible after all. The Muslim kingdoms and states were even more
impressed: delegations were sent from Egypt, Turkey and Arabia to
try and convert the Japanese to Islam, if not the Islamic cause.13
The growing scepticism about the invulnerability of Europe was
further intensified with the onset of  the Second World War. Japan began
–––––––––––––––––
under detention without trial by the Malaysian government. PAS then came under the
leadership of Mohamad Asri Muda, who was a staunch defender of Malay rights and
privileges. Between 1970 to 1982, Asri Muda brought PAS into the ruling Barisan
Nasional coalition and out again (1973-1978). The period of  Asri Muda’s leadership
was highly controversial one. The president himself was involved in a number of
major corruption scandals and later accused of  abusing his power within the party. In
1982, Asri Muda was forced to step down by a new generation of Islamist ulama who
had infiltrated the party from ABIM. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the radicalisation
of  PAS as its new leaders began to confront the UMNO-led coalition government and
the state apparatus on the grounds that the latter were ‘secular’, ‘unIslamic’ and working
in league with Western and Zionist interests. In 1990 PAS regained control of  the state
of  Kelantan, and in 1999 it won control of  Trengganu as well.
13 For a fuller description of these delegations to Japan and the complex debates
within the Muslim world that took place at the time after Japan’s victory over Russia,
see: Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses, (Columbia
University Press, 1986).
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009 M/1430 H 13
The Transnational Debate on the Status of  the “West”
its invasion of Malaya with the sinking of the British warships H.M.S
Repulse and Prince Of  Wales, and followed up with an immediate attack
on Malaya itself and the capture of Singapore. By the end of the
campaign, thousands of British and Dutch soldiers had been taken
prisoner and with them went the image of the European ‘sahib’ who
could command the respect and awe of  the natives. Indonesia, Burma
and the Philippines declared their own independence and the European
powers realised that they would never be able to maintain their colonies
in Southeast Asia ever again.
Malaya (later Malaysia, from 1963) gained its independence in
1957- more than a decade after Indonesia, Burma and the Philippines-
and its own history has been somewhat different ever since. While the
other leaders of Southeast Asia (most notably Sukarno of Indonesia)
were denouncing the West and accusing European and American
powers of trying to destabilise and topple the newly-emerging forces
(Nefos) of  the East, the Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul
Rahman was busy trying to secure Malaysia’s entry into the
Commonwealth and other Western-dominated military and economic
alliances like SEATO (the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation,
dominated by Britain and the United States).
Because of  the consensus of  values and ideology that already
existed between the rulers of  Britain and Malaya, the transfer of  power
and authority from the departing colonial powers to the traditional
Malay ruling elite proved to be uncomplicated. In the words of  Chandra
(1987): ‘both feudal history and British colonialism had thus conspired
to bestow the privilege of power upon this (Malay elite) group’.14 Unlike
Indonesia which had nationalised all Dutch assets when it declared its
independence, the conservative government of  the Federation of
Malaya safeguarded the economic interests and investments of the
British even after they had left.15 Malaya’s Prime Minister Tunku Abdul
Rahman spoke of the ‘special relationship’ between Malaya and Britain
–––––––––––––––––
14 Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, p. 59.
15 Abdullah Ahmad notes that even after independence, ‘rubber, tin, banking,
insurance, shipping and the oil industry were all in British hands’ (p. 8). This in turn
affected Malaya’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Western powers and Britain in particular.
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while the image of post-war Europe, and Britain in particular, was a
highly ambivalent one at this stage in Malaysia.
On the one hand, Europe’s image had been severely dented
thanks to the traumatic experience of  the Second World War. The
conflict which began in the West and soon spread to the rest of  the
world had convinced Asians and Muslims worldwide that the image
of  Western civilization was an illusory one. Europe was also home to
the Western powers that were not too long ago the colonial masters of
Asia and the Muslim world. It was hardly a surprise then that their ex-
colonial subjects did not harbour particularly endearing memories of
them, or any longings to have them back.
But Europe’s seemingly miraculous recovery in the wake of  the
Second World War (financed to a considerable extent by the Marshall
Plan of the United States) was also a source of inspiration for many of
the leaders of Asia and the Muslim world, and Malaya was not an
exception to the rule. It was at this time that the political and business
elite of Malaya (like many other parts of the Muslim world) looked to
the West for guidance and instruction on how to get their economies
and governments in order. The relationship between Malaya and Britain
(and the West in general) was therefore predicated on a chain of
equivalences16 (to borrow Ernesto Laclau’s phrase) which equated Europe
with everything that was good.
–––––––––––––––––
16 The term ‘chain of equivalences’ is taken from the work of Ernesto Laclau
and Chantal Mouffe. Laclau and Mouffe have argued that such chains of equivalences
are formed when there are attempts to instrumentally link together disparate elements
and ideas for specific (political) ends. Thus, the idea of  the West can be linked to other
unrelated concepts like ‘civilisation’, ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ via the adept and skillful
manipulation of language for political purposes. This does not, however, mean that
there is any natural connection between these terms and concepts, and it obviously
follows that each chain of equivalences is an unnatural, non-essential construct that can
only be maintained through certain hegemonic practices. Nonetheless, Laclau and Mouffe
have argued that such practice is indeed commonplace in political activity in general and
the struggle to define, create, break and disarticulate different chains of  equivalences is
part and parcel of  the struggle for hegemony in political life. See: Ernesto Laclau and
Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics,
(London: Verso Press, 1985).
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1. First Chain of  Equivalence: ‘West Good, East Bad’
‘The vanquished always want to imitate the victor in his
distinctive characteristics, his dress, his occupation, and in
all his other conditions and customs. (They) consider the
victor perfect, either because they are impressed by the
respect they have for him, or because they erroneously
assume that their own subservience is not due to the nature
of  their defeat but to the victor’s perfection. If  that
erroneously assumption fixes itself, it becomes a firm
belief. The vanquished then adopts all the manners of the
victor and assimilate themselves to him.
…This, then, is imitation’.
Ibn Khaldun, The Muqadimmah17
Ibn Khaldun’s perceptive observation (quoted above) sums up
the predicament of what Franz Fanon called ‘the mentality of the
colonised’, and such prejudice was certainly not in short supply among
the first generation of  Malaya’s political and economic elite.
From the mid-1940s to the early 1950s, Malaya’s political elite
saw Europe and America as the shining beacons of  instrumentalist
rationality, material development, economic progress, universalism,
cosmopolitanism and human rights (the very subjects of this
conference). Europe was, for the leaders of the newly-independent
countries in Asia and the Muslim world, the birthplace of the renaissance
and the Enlightenment. It was home to Adam Smith, Newton,
Rousseau, Voltaire, Kant and Einstein as well as being a cornucopia
that was brimming with new-found inventions.
It was clear that at that stage of Malayan-European relations,
the Western world was still able to mesmerise the political elite of  the
newly-independent country. The very idea of  Europe, apparently rock-
solid as it stood on its universal foundations, still possessed considerable
hegemonic power over the rest of the world. And it was precisely this
hegemonic dominance that allowed the West to relegate Asia and the
–––––––––––––––––
17 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqadimmah, trans. R. Rosenthal, p. 116.
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Muslim world to the periphery, as Hall and Gieben have argued.18 The
mapping of the world according to the Eurocentric imaginary
effectively created neatly compartmentalised distinctions between the
developed and under-developed, civilised and un-civilised, rational and
irrational, enlightened and obscurantist, progressive and backward.
Needless to say, ‘Europe’ was linked to the first range of  categories
while the rest were lumped with the other. This chain of  equivalences
was obviously an instrumental fiction that had no fundamental
grounding in any ‘European essence’ or primordial genius that was
unique and exclusive to Europeans alone, but it was underpinned by
very real structures and institutions of  power, control and dominance
which ensured that the positive categorisation of Europe would remain
uncontested.
Cognisant of the new political realities that stood before the
newly independent state, Malaya’s leaders began to formulate their
foreign, domestic and education policies accordingly. Under the
leadership of  Tunku Abdul Rahman Malaya spent more on education
that any other country in Southeast Asia (a trend that persists till today)
and the government was keen to send the best and brightest among
the youth to the West to study. Malaya began sending thousands of
young Malay-Muslim students to study abroad in Britain and the United
States- both of  which were anglophone countries while the former
was particularly favoured for its academic system which was compatible
–––––––––––––––––
18 See: Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, “The West and the Rest: Discourse and
Power”, in Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben (eds.), The Formation of  Modernity, (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1992). Hall and Gieben have argued that the concept of  the ‘West’ (here
meant to be understood as encompassing Western Europe and North America) was
never a concrete bloc or unified entity, but rather a discursive construct that operated on
a number of  different discursive registers. The notion of  a unified West was invariably
projected in much of  Western political, academic and economic discourse. In most
cases, the deployment of the concept was intended to help create a boundary effect
between the West and the rest, mapped out according to a eurocentric geography which
placed Europe (and later America as well) at the centre of the world. This eurocentric
view of  the world helped to consolidate Europe’s own hegemonic grasp on other
cultures and societies. It allowed for, and justified, policies and measures that invariably
placed the West on unequal terms with the rest and projected the Western model as the
norm to be emulated on a global (thus universal) level.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009 M/1430 H 17
The Transnational Debate on the Status of  the “West”
to that of  Malaya’s. Malayan students were sent to study in both arts
and sciences, and Britain was the favourite destination for those who
wanted to enter the Malayan civil service.
Britain under the leadership of Harold MacMillan had managed
to re-start its economy and was beginning to introduce the first
constitutional and institutional reforms that would pave the way for a
welfare state. For ordinary Malayans, the colonial metropole seemed
to embody all that was worthy of emulation. They spoke of the free
health and education services in glowing terms, painting an image of
Britain as the land of  milk, honey, subsidised housing, central heating
and free dental check-ups. Malayans were also impressed by Britain’s
election process (the first elections in Malaya were only held in 1955)
and the freedom of  expression enjoyed by the vocal press in the country.
Britain’s liberal-capitalist system also seemed to promise
Malayans the goods and services they had been dreaming of  for decades.
Malayan students and elites alike travelled to London (and the other
capitals of Europe and America) to stock up on goods that could not
be found back home in Malaya. The elite were keen to emulate the
glamorous life-style of  Europe’s rich and famous, with whom some of
them got along famously. (Tunku Abdul Rahman was well known in
European diplomatic and governmental circles. His anglophile
inclinations endeared him to many European politicians who regarded
him as someone they ‘could do business with’ and his own feudal
background made him feel all the more comfortable in London’s
gentlemen’s clubs.)
But while Malaya’s elite were busy playing court with the political
and business elite in Europe, other shifts and changes were taking
place on the international scene that would later alter the popular
perception of  the West in the eyes of  the Malayans back home.
2. Second chain of  equivalence: ‘East Good, West Bad’
‘They (Westernised Muslims) have all become
conscious or unconscious agents of  Western culture and
civilisation, and in this capacity they represent what we
have identified as the external sources of our Muslim
dilemma… In their present condition they pose as the
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external menace which has become a grave internal
problem, for intellectually, dar al-harb has advanced
within dar-al-Islam; they have become the enemy within’.
Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism19
Popular though they were, the Tunku’s parties could not go on
forever. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, newly-independent Malaya
found itself being rapidly out-manoeuvred on the international level
by other more aggressively anti-Western countries and leaders like
Indonesia’s Sukarno and India’s Nehru. Malaya’s close relationship with
Britain (which was underpinned by its dependency on the West for
capital investment as well as military assistance) made it appear as the
dark horse in the stable of the newly-independent countries that were
in the non-aligned movement. The anglophile and eurocentric
proclivities of  Malaya’s leaders and ruling elite also singled them out
at the numerous South-South conferences where every Third World
leader was expected to pepper his speeches with barbed invectives
directed towards the evil forces of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism
that were hovering above the Southern nations like predatory vultures.
When Tunku Abdul Rahman announced the plan to expand the
Federation of  Malaya by including Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah (the
latter two from North Borneo) in 1963,20 Malaya’s neighbours were
incensed. The leaders of Indonesia and the Philippines denounced the
move as a betrayal on the part of Malaya- which they accused of acting
as the Trojan horse for British and American neo-colonial interests.
Goaded by the Indonesian Communist leader Dwipa Nusantara Aidit
and under pressure from the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) with
–––––––––––––––––
19 Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, (Kuala Lumpur: ABIM
(Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia) Press, 1978), p. 128. For a critique of  the works and
ideas of al-Attas, see: Mona Abaza, Rethinking the Social Knowledge of Islam: Critical
Explorations in the Islamisation of Knowledge Debate between Malaysia and Egypt’, unpublished
Doctoral thesis for the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, Berlin, 1998, esp. Chapter 6, pp.
85-107.
20 The Federation would henceforth be renamed the Federation of  Malaysia. In
1965 Singapore broke away from the federation due to increasing inter-ethnic tension
between the Malays and the Chinese (who were a majority in Singapore). The two states
of  East Malaysia have remained in the country.
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whom he was allied, Sukarno unilaterally declared a military campaign
to ‘crush Malaya’ (‘ganyang Malaya’) which became known as the
Konfrontasi of 1963-1965.
Sukarno’s decision to declare Konfrontasi against Malaya came as
the biggest blow to the links between the Malayan and Indonesian
Malay-Muslim movements. For up to the mid-20th century the level of
contact and movement between the peoples of the Malay archipelago
was exceedingly high. Even during the height of colonial power and
influence in the region, the movement of people, goods and ideas within
the archipelago was never arrested or fully controlled. However, as
soon as hostilities between Malaysia and Indonesia were declared, it
became practically impossible for the Malay-Muslims of Malaysia to
maintain contact with their Indonesian counterparts. Malaysian students
who were studying in the madrasahs and pesantrens of Indonesia were
immediately ordered to return home and then re-directed to Europe or
the Middle-East instead. After centuries of transnational contact, the
Malay-Muslim world was split apart once more thanks to Sukarno’s
decision to bend to the will of  the Communists.
The Konfrontasi with Indonesia had also taught the Malaysians a
few other lessons. By 1963-65, Malaysians had begun to realise that
their own role in the region and their close relationship with the West
and Britain in particular was seen as problematic by the other
neighbouring states of Southeast Asia.
The 1960s witnessed the emergence of popular anti-colonial and
anti-Western movements the world over, and the influence of  their
movements, their ideas and their leaders could be felt everywhere in
Malaysia. It was during this time that the leadership of the Pan-
Malaysian Islamic party (PAS), then under the capable guidance of  its
most sophisticated and vocal president Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy,
began to attack the Malaysian government for its dependency on
European and American powers. In his speeches, Dr. Burhanuddin
(who was a fervent admirer and follower of  Sukarno in his youth)
condemned the leadership of  Tunku Abdul Rahman and the UMNO-
led government for their betrayal of Malay-Muslim interests and for
their willingness to bend over backwards to meet the demands and
conditions imposed by the West. The more articulate among the PAS
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leaders attacked the Malaysian government for not doing enough to
nationalise the assets of the departed colonial powers and for signing
numerous military pacts with Britain in particular that jeopardised
Malaysia’s standing as a neutral country and a member of  the non-
aligned movement. Dr. Burhanuddin cited the example of  Muslim
countries (like Egypt under Gammel Nasser and Indonesia under
Sukarno) that had defied the will of the capitalists of Europe and
America by nationalising the major industries of their respective
countries and introducing the fundamental structures of  a welfare state.
It was during this period that the political mood in the country
began to take a radical turn. PAS, under Dr. Burhanuddin, had been
transformed into a radical leftist-Islamist party that was vehemently
opposed to all forms of  neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. The
leaders of  PAS injected into their followers and supporters a new level
of  political awareness that made them see the struggle of  Asians and
Muslims worldwide as their own. They condemned the conduct of
European and American troops in the Korean War and the Vietnam
War that came after. They also condemned the European powers for
their continued interference in their ex-colonies. Britain’s meddling in
parts of  Africa; France’s part in the brutal conflict in Algeria; America’s
shady intrigues in Iran, Vietnam and Indonesia and Belgium’s sordid
role in the assassination of the Congolese nationalist leader Patrice
Lumumba became the topics of the day that painted a new portrait of
Europe in lurid colours.
Thanks to the combined efforts of its external and internal critics,
Europe had finally been decentred and dethroned. But this decentring
of  the West also opened the way for the deperipheralisation of  the rest
of the world, as Sayyid (1997) puts it:
Decentring does not refer solely to the unity of  the West, but also to
the relation between the West and the rest. If  the West is decentred, it
must be decentred in relation to the non-West; for without a centre
there can be no periphery. The decentring of  the West means that the
non-West can no longer be treated as the periphery.21
–––––––––––––––––
21 Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of  Islamism,
(London: Zed Books, 1997), p. 110.
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Thus by the 1960s, a new chain of equivalences was being created
thanks to the incessant critiques against Europe and the West in general
by the radical leftist and Islamist opposition leaders in Malaysia and
the rest of  the non-Western world. With the decentring of  Europe and
the Western ideal, the way was now open for a different image of
Europe to be drawn by the non-Europeans themselves.
Whereas Europe in the 1950s was seen by Malaysians as a
promised land of hope and renewal, the same Europe from the mid-
1960s onwards was seen as the source of many (if not all) of the ills
of the rest of the world. The liberal-capitalist culture of Europe was
no longer a source of  precious and eagerly sought goods and services:
Instead it became synonymous with moral decadence, corruption, abuse
of  power and structural inequalities that incurred their human cost on
other parts of the world. The pattern of growth and social development
in Europe was no longer seen as rationalistic (or if it was then it was
re-cast as a form of  instrumentalist rationality taken one step too far,
which had brought Europeans to the brink of social collapse and
environmental disaster). Worse still, Europe and European culture was
seen as having a morally corrupting influence on the value and belief
systems of Asians and Muslims worldwide. The outlandish and
flamboyant escapades and shenanigans of Asian and Muslim leaders
in Europe angered the more conservative, traditional and impoverished
sections of  their own communities.
In countries like Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt and Malaysia, the
experiment with European-style modernisation and development
undertaken by the respective regimes had encountered serious
difficulties. Under the rule of  the Pehlavi dynasty, Iran had managed
to develop its economy, military and bureaucracy but at the expense
of civil liberties and public freedom. In 1953 Iran experienced a political
crisis when the popular leader Mohammad Mosaddeq and his Tudeh
party came to power, ousting Muhhamad Reza Shah.
In the few countries where the Islamists had actually managed
to secure some kind of foothold on the political system, they found
that they achievements were reduced to naught by secular anti-Islamist
leaders who were not prepared to engage with the forces of Islamic
resurgence itself. When the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party managed to
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gain control of  two state governments (Kelantan and Trengganu) after
the federal elections of 1959, they found themselves at the receiving
end of  the state’s anti-Islamist polemics. PAS was denounced by the
anglophile and Westernised leaders of  UMNO as a party of  ‘extremists’
and ‘fanatics’ who were bent on chopping off the heads and hands of
criminal offenders. The leaders and members of  the Islamist party were
cast as backward country peasants who had no ideas about how to run
a state, much less the country.
In time, the dependency of  the Muslims on the West, both in
terms of  direct financial and military support as well as a source of
political theories and developmental models, became an issue in itself.
Several modern Muslim intellectuals began to condemn the influence
of  Western ideas and secular values in the mindset of  Muslims, claiming
that the corrupting influence of  ‘Occidentalisis’ was the key factor
explaining the intellectual and political frailty of the Muslim Ummah.
The Iranian intellectual Jalal-e Ahmad’s book Gharbzadegi
(Occidentalisis) that was published in 1962 provided such a critique.
Such ideas were also gaining currency in other parts of the Muslim
world, and the Malay-Muslim students who were being sent to Europe
in the 1960s-1970s had their own ideas about the old world they were
about to discover. What they found was a Europe wracked with
problems and internal contradictions of its own that fit neatly with the
image of  the West that they had come to inherit from the new gene-
ration of Islamist and Leftist radicals who had taken over the opposition
parties, newspapers and campuses in their own country. The stage was
therefore set for a cultural marriage of inconvenience that none of the
technocrats in the Ministry of  Education had prepared for.
D. Go West, Young Man: The experience of  the Malay-Muslim
Student Diaspora in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s
‘The rise of Islamism was only possible when the availability of
Islam could be articulated into a counter-hegemonic discourse’
Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and
the Emergence of  Islamism22
–––––––––––––––––
22 Ibid., p. 73.
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By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the discursive terrain in
Malaysia (as well as many other parts of Asia and the Muslim world)
had begun to shift once again. Malaysia, being both an Asian country
as well as a member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) was caught up in both currents and its domestic political
environment was altered accordingly. This in turn had serious and lasting
repercussions on its relationship with Europe and the West in general.
The first moves in the new game were made by men like Sukarno,
Muammar Ghadaffi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan. Sukarno had
tried to forge a working coalition between the Islamists, Leftists and
Nationalists of  Indonesia (the so-called NASAKOM alliance) and
found that the best way of bringing the warring factions together was
to offer them a convenient enemy: the West. But it was Muammar
Ghadaffi who later got the ball rolling when he launched his hugely
popular people’s revolution in the wake of  the coup against Sultan Idris
in 1969. His attempt to promote his own school of ‘Islamic-Socialism’
culminated in the infamous ‘Green Book’ which laid out the guidelines
for the complete take-over of the private sector by the ordinary Libyan
masses and the setting up of  a popular people’s government in the
country. A liberal dose of  Ghadaffi’s own brand of  ‘progressive Islam’
was added to the recipe, in order to give the revolution a moral and
theological basis that would resonate with the populace.23
It is important to note that in the case of  Sukarno, Ghadaffi and
Bhutto we encounter examples of ‘reversed Orientalism’ at work. Their
impressive projects were fundamentally different forms of  nation-
–––––––––––––––––
23 Colonel Muammar Ghadaffi finally launched the people’s revolution
(jamahiriyah) in Libya in March 1977. The country’s name was changed to the ‘Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah’. Working according to the economic policy formulated
in his Green Book, Ghadaffi later turned the country into a decentralised people’s socialist
collective where workers were encouraged to take control of factories and businesses.
Private retail trade was wiped out, and citizens and workers committees took over local
government. Ghadaffi also promoted his brand of ‘socialist Islam’ and attacked the
ulama who he regarded as being backward and reactionary. The ulama in turn attacked
Ghadaffi’s version of  socialist Islam as being bid’a (unlawful innovation) that was
contrary to the teachings of  Islam. Ghadaffi’s response was simply to have the un-
coorperative ulama thrown in jail along with the rest of  the ‘people’s enemies’ and
remnants of the ‘feudal era’.
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building that was a curious melange of modernist ideas and essentialist
notions of what an ‘authentic’ and ‘pure’ Islam was like. All of them
claimed that theirs was an attempt to ‘return’ Islam to its original state,
to revive the internal dynamics within Islam and to liberate the collective
Muslim consciousness from the chains of political, economic, military
and cultural dependency on the West. Europe and America loomed
large in the discourse of  these leaders, and the West was invariably
painted in caricatured terms that nonetheless served its purpose as the
instrumental fiction that was required in order to animate the logic of
their grand designs. Reactive though their projects may have seemed,
there was nonetheless an element of creative agency at work which
made it a radical transformative endeavour. As Nicholas Thomas puts
it:
Even if  (political) resistance seems to entail merely a return to former
circumstances, of  indigenous sovereignty and cultural autonomy, the
struggle to recreate such conditions nevertheless engenders novel
perceptions of  identity, action and history. What appears to be simply
reactive or retrogressive thus amounts to a project, to a whole
transformative endeavour.24
The other important factor to note is that the image and idea of
Europe was (and remains) a crucial defining element in the entire
enterprise of political Islamism. The assertion of a reactive Islamic
identity- in whatever essentialist terms it might be couched- requires
nevertheless the presence of  Europe as its constitutive Other. Europe
therefore becomes the key foundational element that props up the
project of Islamic revivalism in this sense. As Chandra notes:
Opposition to Western thought has continued to play a vital role in
strengthening and sustaining the (Islamist) movement. It is not just
rejection of secularism but also of modernism, nationalism, capitalism,
socialism and indeed every other ‘ism’ that the West has spawned.25
In the end, saying ‘no’ to Europe became another way of saying
‘yes’ to Islam. Though the form and content of  that Islam remain
–––––––––––––––––
24 Nicholas Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government,
(London: Verso Press, 1995), p. 87.
25 Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, p. 21.
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undefined, what was important was the creation of the boundary-effect
that drew the political and ideological horizons between Islam and the
West, the Muslim world and Europe.
Malaysia was not immune to the changes that were taking place
all over the Islamic world at the time. In 1972 Malaysia’s second Prime
Minister Tun Razak was invited to visit Lahore to attend the second
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit hosted by
Pakistan. During the visit Tun Razak had the opportunity to meet with
other prominent leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Muammar Ghadaffi
and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. The OIC summit had a ‘tremendous
impact’ on Tun Razak, who congratulated Bhutto for his adroit handling
of  the event.26 But it also convinced Tun Razak of  the need for
Malaysia to play a more visible and active role on the international
scene and the Islamic conference in particular. Tun Razak was
undoubtedly impressed by the way that Bhutto had managed to
orchestrate such a high-profile event that did wonders for his own
Islamist credentials. If  Bhutto could open the first International Seerat
Congress to commemorate the life and teachings of the Prophet
Muhammad, then surely the politicians of Malaysia could surely do
the same. It was at this time that the Malaysian government began lay
down the foundations for what would later become its own state-
sponsored Islamisation programme. UMNO, under Tun Razak, was
already boasting that it had managed to facilitate the conversion of
75,000 Malaysian non-Muslims to Islam thanks to its own dakwah
(missionary) activities.27
Homesick in London: The Dream of Islamic Revival among the Malaysian-
Muslim Diaspora
The Malaysian students who were travelling to Europe then were
themselves the products of this new era. An overwhelming majority
of them were from lower-middle class families, many of whom were
–––––––––––––––––
26 Stanley Wolpert, Zufi Bhutto of  Pakistan: His Life and Times, (Karachi: Oxford,
1993), p. 234.
27 The highest rate of conversions to Islam then was in the East Malaysian state
of Sabah, which was under the rule of its Chief Minister Datuk Mustapha Harun.
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themselves first generation migrants to the cities. They were mainly
the benefactors of  the pro-Malay New Economic Policy28 (put into
place in 1970) and the targets of  the UMNO-led government’s own
Islamisation programme. Chandra’s (1987) general description of  the
average Malaysian student of the 1970s sums up the problems and
internal contradictions that they brought with them to Europe:
From the 1970s onwards, a new type of Malay student began entering
the institutions of higher learning in the country and abroad. Unlike the
small clusters of Malays in the 1950s and early 1960s who generally
came from wealthier families, students in the post-1970 period were
more rural in origin. Less wealthy and more deeply attached to religious
rituals and symbols, they also tended to be much more fluent in Malay
rather than in English. Besides this, they also seemed to be less analytical
and critical in their thinking… This background - affected their total
outlook. Less confident and less secure, both emotionally and
intellectually, many of  these students did not want to encounter new
ideas and new theories, with all the doubts and uncertainties that
accompany such an adventure. They would rather stick to what was
familiar; they would rather derive comfort and solace from the little
knowledge they had accumulated, sanctified by religion and authority.
Students in such a frame of mind were very susceptible to the sort of
argument that suggests that knowledge outside of  traditional Islam
was nonsense, that ideas from the West were dangerous and destructive
and that secularism was the greatest enemy of mankind.29
For this generation of  Malay-Muslims, it was Islam that was
rapidly becoming the central pillar to their own sense of  identity.
–––––––––––––––––
28 The New Economic Policy (NEP) that was launched in 1970 was meant to
secure two important goals: the eradication of poverty irrespective of race and the
restructuring of the Malaysian economy to the end that economic differences will no
longer be identified with race. Jomo (1986) has noted that ‘as it was officially elaborated,
the first poverty eradication prong of the NEP was certainly not to be achieved by
eliminating class exploitation. The established interests of the property owning classes
were respected, at least in principle. Efforts to improve the lot of wage earners, beyond
employment promotion measures, were virtually non-existent. The measures for poverty
eradication that were announced did not offend existing propertied interests, and hence
no land reform for example’. For a further critique of  the NEP, see Jomo K. Sundaram,
A Question of  Class, (1986), pp. 256-260.
29 Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, pp. 30-31.
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Malaysia’s entry into the OIC, the country’s move closer to other Muslim
states and the Islamisation programme that had begun in the country
(initiated by UMNO, in a bid to out-flank its opponent PAS) all
contributed to the growing awareness of Islam and the sense of Muslim
identity among Malay-Muslims, particularly among the younger
generation of  rural migrants to the cities. This was also a time when
Malaysia was experiencing the first wave of ‘Islamisation from below’,
with new non-governmental Islamist organisations like the Angkatan
Belia Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement- ABIM) and
the Sufi-inspired Darul Arqam movement taking over the campuses
and urban settlements of  the country.
The emergence of  movements like Darul Arqam and ABIM in
Malaysia was symptomatic of the changes taking place in Malay-Muslim
society as a whole. Thanks to the Islamisation race between UMNO
and PAS which had begun in the 1960s, Islamic influences had
penetrated even deeper into the political, economic and cultural
environment of  the Malays in the country. The inflation of  Islamic
discourse in Malay-Muslim society meant that Malay politics had begun
to shift to a more Islamist discursive register. The 1970s witnessed not
only the development of new Islamic movements in the country but
also the first signs of  popular Islamic resurgence that came in the form
of  Islamic dress, social norms, modes of  communication and Islamic
literature. Ironically, it was the contestation between PAS and UMNO
that helped to create these new Islamist movements.
While their counterparts in Malaysia were being courted by the
various Islamist movements and parties like ABIM, Darul Arqam and
PAS, the Malay-Muslim students who were studying abroad in Europe
were coming into contact with other Muslim students from the rest of
the Muslim world. For the first time in history, large numbers of  young
Muslims- Arabs, Africans, Central Asians, South Asians, Southeast
Asians and Europeans - were meeting together in an alien (i.e. non-
Muslim) setting. The one common factor between them was that they
all belonged to the same faith. Though Malcolm X had gone one step
further when he said that all human beings- Muslims and non-Muslims
alike- were equal before God because they snored in the same language.
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The universities and polytechnics of London, Manchester,
Liverpool, Bradford, Edinburg and Brighton were the places where
Malay-Muslim students were learning not only about economics and
engineering- they were also discussing the ideas of prominent Muslim
thinkers and Islamist activists like Maulana Ab’ul Al’a Maudoodi of
Pakistan, Hassan al-Banna of  Egypt, Malek Ben Nabi of  Algeria and
the Islamist intellectual Ismail Raj Faruqi of  the United States. (Ismail
Raj Faruqi was destined to play a crucial role in this meeting of  minds,
for he would later help to direct the political career of Anwar Ibrahim.
It was Faruqi who prompted Anwar to join the UMNO party in 1982.)
They also came to learn more about the experiences of Muslims from
other countries by talking with the students who came from there. It
was hardly a coincidence, then, that the Malaysian students in Britain
(and other Western countries) were more clued up about the latest
developments in Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Algeria and Egypt. And while
the governments, media and NGOs of  the West were bemoaning the
fate of Muslim women and demanding Muslim governments to live up
to the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which
was drafted, we must remember, at a time when most Muslim countries
were still the colonies of  the Western imperial powers), the younger
generation of  Muslim students in the West were more concerned about
the fate of persecuted Muslim minorities in places like Palestine, Russia,
India, Kashmir and the Philippines.
While abroad, the Malay-Muslims students in Britain and the
rest of Europe also gained a first-hand impression of what life in the
West was really like. Britain in the 1970s was another country altogether
compared to what it was in the 1950s. The rise of  xenophobia and
racism, the climate of prejudice towards foreigners (even if they
happened to be foreign students who were paying full fees at their
colleges), the deteriorating economy (made worse by the oil crisis of
1973), growing homelessness and unemployment, the evident
breakdown of law and order in the inner cities, the growing problem
of domestic violence, rape, single-parent families (still a taboo subject
for most Asian and Muslim societies), the fear of an impending nuclear
holocaust and a total breakdown of the eco-system in the most
developed parts of North-western Europe- all contributed to the
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growing feeling that Europe was the ‘sick man of the world’ and that
the European model of development was leading nowhere fast. As
Chandra sums it up:
It is because of  all this that the West was no longer seen as a civilisation
worthy of emulation. It appears to be aimless and uncertain at this
juncture in history. Malay-Muslim students in universities in the United
States, Britain and Australia (were) among those who were totally
convinced that the West had reached its twilight. …Confronted by a
new reality, the later generation of  Malaysian students abroad had no
doubt at all that Islam was about to herald the new dawn of a new
civilisation.30
The sense of  Islam’s manifest destiny was made all the more
strong by the contact with other Islamist leaders and movements that
were based in Europe at the time. For Britain was also a good place to
make contact with a variety of Islamist opposition parties, clandestine
networks and underground movements. It was here that the Malaysian-
Muslim students first encountered the representatives of groups like
the Jama’at-i Islami, Ikhwan’ul Muslimin, the Palestinian Liberation
Organisation (PLO), Hizbullah, Hamas, Muhamadiyyah and others.
Ironically, it was the experience of  being in Britain that brought Malay-
Muslim students closer to each other and their Muslim brothers and
sisters from the rest of the Muslim world-a stark reminder of how
drastically the political geography of the Muslim world has changed
since the 19th century.
In time these Malaysian students began to form a number of
organisations and networks of their own. The Malaysian Muslim student
organisations that were based in Britain began to learn from other
Islamist student organisations and networks, and they adapted the
methods and tactics employed by these organisations to suit their own
needs.
One of  the results of  this networking process was the formation
of the Islamic Representative Council (IRC) which began to show itself
on the (British and Malaysian) campus scene by the 1970s. During the
early stages of Islamist student activism between 1969 to 1976 the
–––––––––––––––––
30 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
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Muslim student movements in the local campuses were dominated by
Malay-Muslim students from the arts faculties. This situation only began
to change in by the mid-1970s when the leadership of the local and
international university student movements fell into the hands of
Malay-Muslim scholars from the science stream, who were more rigid
and militant in their approach. These students eventually formed the
IRC which adopted a more covert approach to their activities. The
IRC organised itself  in the form of  cells which then penetrated into
the local campuses and other existing organisations in order to spread
their Islamic message from within. Shamsul Baharuddin notes that:
Because this organisation was born outside the Malaysian socio-political
milieu and was informed mainly by sectarian Islamist groups based in
the Middle East and South Asia, its focus was more on religion for
religion’s sake than  religion for society’s sake. The IRC saw ABIM’s
brand of Islam as too ‘spicy’ and impure (re. tolerant of heterogeneity),
unlike theirs which was more true to the original and pure (re. demanding
total response). …The IRC group adopted the educational approach
or tarbiyyah, through the formation and spread of  small cells among
the students. The denounced the Malaysian government as un-Islamic
and accused it of upholding a secular and infidel system of rule.
Recruiting from among the science students, the IRC adopted what
could be seen as a black-and-white approach to Islam. In their view
one either practiced Islam in a complete way or was an infidel; one
either fought for Islam or was irreligious, if a member of an Islamic
group one had to be a full-time dakwah activist, and not merely a
sympathiser.31
The appearance of Islamist youth movements and organisations
like ABIM, the IRC and Darul Arqam were among the first signs that
the UMNO-led government’s developmentalist paradigm was losing
its appeal to the Malay-Muslims of  the country.
In an ironic twist of fate, the UMNO-led government had
managed to sow the seeds of its own downfall by creating these
educational institutions that it could not control effectively. While
UMNO could prove its worth by building such institutions of higher
–––––––––––––––––
31 Shamsul A. Baharuddin, Identity Construction, p. 215.
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education for the benefit of the Malays, it could not control what was
happening in them. Likewise, the UMNO-led government had tried to
demonstrate its concern for the plight of the Malays by sending
thousands of poor Malay students to study abroad- but it was unable
to monitor and control the activities that took place in those centres
of  learning so far away. The universities and colleges (both local and
foreign) were meant to reproduce the Malay-Muslim middle-classes
who would later go on to work within the economic and political
institutions founded by UMNO and the government, but they had
instead been turned into breeding grounds for Islamist radicals and
activists who were openly challenging the ideology of  UMNO. In the
minds of the technocrats and nation-builders of Malaysia, something
had clearly gone wrong.
In a sense, ‘Europe’ had let the Malaysian government down, in
more ways that one. It was hoped that the Malay-Muslim students
who were sent to the West would come back bringing with them valuable
knowledge and technical know-how that was meant to help Malaysia
catch up in the development race. They were meant to be the future
technocrats, academics, economists and corporate elite who would
uplift the economic and political lot of  the country, thereby helping to
create the economic ‘miracle’ that everyone had longed for. But the
mistake of the Malaysian technocrats and politicians lay in their
assumption that there was still one, singular, unified Europe that they
were sending their students to. In reality Europe had already become a
contested concept and a contested space. In the end the Malaysian
students came back with their beards, skull caps, tasbihs and hijab,
homesick and dreaming of returning to the Golden Age of Islam.
E. Come Home, Young Islamist: the Return of  the Second
Generation of Malay-Muslim Students from Europe and
Their Impact on the Malaysian Political Scene
‘They (the UMNO-led government) thought that by sending
our students to the West they could secularise them and make
them less Muslim. But Alhamdulillah, thanks to Allah all our
students have grown even more Islamic and have joined us
(the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS).’
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Speech by Ustaz Hadi Awang, Vice-President of  PAS (The Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party) during the election campaign of 1999.
The Malaysia that the students were returning to was also a
radically different one. As pointed out earlier, Malaysia was not immune
to the changes that were taking place in the rest of the Muslim world
and these changes were bound to have an effect on how Muslims the
world over viewed themselves and their relationship with the Other.
The rise of political Islam or Islamism from the mid-20th century
onwards furnished the discourse of Muslim political elites, scholars,
intellectuals, artists and Islamist activists with a new and radically
different image of Europe that would remain for a long time to come.
By the 1980s, these changes had led to the rise of a new
generation of politicians and Islamists in Malaysia as well. In 1981
Malaysia witnessed the coming to power of  Dr. Mahathir Mohamad -
the staunchly pro-Southern, anti-Western Malay nationalist leader who
was one of the few UMNO politicians who had dared to defy the will
of  the anglophile Tunku Abdul Rahman in the 1960s. (For his sins, Dr.
Mahathir was temporarily kicked out of the party in 1969). One year
later the UMNO party welcomed the young and charismatic ABIM
leader Anwar Ibrahim who had abandoned the Islamist movement he
had formed and led- much to the shock and dismay of  the Islamists
who wanted to see him take over the leadership of the Islamist party
PAS.
In the same year (1982) the Islamist party also experienced an
internal coup of  sorts when the conservative ‘ulama’ faction took over
the leadership of  PAS. This led to the rise of  a new generation of
ulama-activists, many of whom were educated both in the Arab world
and the West. They included men like Ustaz Yusuf  Rawa, Abdul Hadi
Awang and Fadzil Mohamad Noor (Many of  these leaders were
themselves ex-student activists who had studied at the local and foreign
universities and were linked to ABIM or the IRC).
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a radical reversal in the way in
which the ‘West’  was viewed by the new political elite and middle-
classes in Malaysia. Dr. Mahathir made his own views abundantly clear
when he announced that henceforth Malaysia would be ‘looking East’
instead of  to the West for inspiration and assistance in its development.
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In 1981 he also launched the ‘Buy British Last’ policy- which was
warmly received by many sections of  Malaysia’s new society.
Apart from his diatribes against the West with its ‘conspiracies’
against the Muslim world, Dr. Mahathir also became known as one of
the major proponents of  the so-called ‘Asian values’ school. (The other
advocate of  the same school being Lee Kuan Yew, Premier of
Singapore). Mahathir argued that the Western understanding of  human
rights and entitlements was a culturally specific concept that had no
relevance for Asians or non-Europeans in general. Along with Lee Kuan
Yew and a handful of  other Asian leaders, he began to call for an
‘Asian’ interpretation of  human rights that linked fundamental freedoms
to basic obligations to society and the State as well. I have argued
elsewhere, that this reactive approach to Human Rights was based on
two fundamental premises- the rejection of  all things Western; and a
call for a return to a politics of authenticity predicated on essentialist
notions of  what an Asian identity was.32 Surfing on the crest of  the
latest postmodern anti-universalist wave, leaders like Mahathir were
actively engaged in an attempt to create a new counter-hegemonic
discourse that was rooted in a localised idiom. Not surprisingly, in the
case of Malaysia this idiom was both Asian and Islamic at the same
time.
But the image of Europe was something that neither the leaders
of  UMNO nor the leaders of  PAS could do away with. As Dr. Mahathir
launched his own state Islamisation programme in 1982 (which led to
the opening of  the International Islamic University, the Malaysian
Islamic Bank, the Pilgrimage Fund and a network of Islamic think-
tanks, research centres and institutes), he and the other leaders of
UMNO were scathing in their attacks on the West which was labelled
as morally degenerate, corrupt and intellectually bankrupt in toto. The
leaders of  PAS were careful not to be left behind. In their continued
assaults against the government of  Dr. Mahathir, they made every effort
to establish yet another chain of equivalences between the government
–––––––––––––––––
32 See: Farish A. Noor, “Values in the Dynamics of  Malaysia’s Internal and
External Political Relations”, in Han Sung-Joo (ed.), Changing Values in Asia: Their
Impact on Governance and Development, (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange
(JCIE),  1999).
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and the evil, secular culture of  the West.
Damned by both conservative and Islamist alike, Europe and
the ‘West’ in general became the depository of  all that was corrupt,
base, evil and degraded in the world. But the most bitter and devastating
attacks on the European idea came from a Malaysian Islamist intellectual
and scholar who was himself  the product of  Western education and
upbringing: Syed Naquib al-Attas.
All that Europe Ain’t: Muslim Malaysia vs the Secular West in
the Reversed Orientalism of Syed Naquib al-Attas
‘Islam totally rejects any application to itself of the concepts
of secular, secularisation or secularism as they do not belong
and are alien to it in every respect’.
Syed Naquib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism
It could be argued that no Malaysian intellectual or scholar has
been able to demonise the West as effectively as the prominent Islamist
thinker Professor Syed Naquib al-Attas.33 Al-Attas, who was himself
the product of Eton, Sandhurst and the School of Oriental and African
Studies (SOAS) in London, became a source of  inspiration for an entire
–––––––––––––––––
33 Syed Naquib al-Attas is perhaps one of the most well-known if not
controversial Islamist thinkers in Malaysia today. His influence extends well beyond the
confines of academia and he has played an important role in the cultivation of the
Islamic elite in the country. He comes from one of  the most famous aristocratic families
in the south and is of mixed Malay-Arabic stock. In his youth he studied in England,
first at Eton and then at Sandhurst Military Academy and later at the School of Oriental
and African Studies (SOAS), University of  London. His early academic researches were
into the fields of Malay Sufism and literature. His fame was assured when he published
his two-volume dissertation The Mysticism of  Hamzah Fansuri (1965, published 1970).
He later developed much of his educational philosophy with this Sufi influence clearly
apparent in his work. He also prides himself as a designer, calligrapher and artist. He
was given the opportunity to create The International Institute for Islamic Thought
and Civilisation (ISTAC) in 1991 and in 1993 he was awarded the Al-Ghazali Chair of
Islamic Philosophy by the Malaysian government (The award was presented by none
other than his own  student-turned-politician Anwar Ibrahim, who was then a Minister
in the Cabinet). He was awarded the membership of the Royal Jordanian Academy in
1994 and honoured with an honorary doctorate from the University of Khartoum in
1995.
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generation of  Malay-Muslim university students. He later came to head
the International Institute of  Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC)
that is based in Kuala Lumpur.34 But al-Attas’s most popular and
influential book has always been ‘Islam and Secularism’, which was first
published by ABIM in 1978 (the same year that Edward Said’s
Orientalism was published in the West) and which became the standard
reference for an entire generation of middle-class professionals,
politicians, students and teachers in the country.
Al-Attas’s impact on the student body was considerable. He was
the intellectual figurehead behind the Malaysian Islamic Youth
Movement (ABIM) as well as the personal guide of the young ex-ABIM
leader-turned UMNO politician, Anwar Ibrahim.35 In Malaysian
academic circles, Naquib al-Attas is known as the Malaysian proponent
of the project of ‘Islamisation of knowledge’. In high-level social and
–––––––––––––––––
34 The International Institute for Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC)
was formed in 1991. It was, from the very beginning, the brainchild of its founder-
director, Syed Naquib al-Attas. Anwar Ibrahim, the ex-president of ABIM, was the
first Chairman of ISTAC. In its early years, ISTAC received much support and patronage
from the Malaysian government, both in terms of financial assistance as well as publicity
and the endorsement of its activities by the government. In the preface of the second
edition (1993) of his book ‘Islam and Secularism’, al-Attas outlines the mandate and
agenda of  his institute: ‘Among its most important aims and objectives are to
conceptualise, clarify, elaborate scientific and epistemological problems encountered by
Muslims in this modern age; to provide an Islamic response to the intellectual and
cultural challenges of the modern world and various schools of thought, religion and
ideology; to formulate an Islamic philosophy of education; including the definitions,
aims and objectives of Islamic education, to formulate an Islamic philosophy of science’.
(p. xiii). In short, the aim of  ISTAC was to spearhead al-Attas’s own project of  the
Islamisation of knowledge which in turn is intimately linked to his political project of
the revival of the spirit of Islam through the creation of a new class of intellectually
competent and knowledgeable Islamic leaders who conform to the rules of adab and
the social and political hierarchies al-Attas regards as essentially Islamic. Al-Attas was
given a lot of freedom in designing ISTAC, down to its architectural details. The main
building which houses the library, conference hall and research units was designed by
him and reflect strong Hispano-Moorish styles and features.
35 Chandra Muzaffar has noted that ‘within the country the person who had the
greatest influence on Anwar Ibrahim in his ABIM years was Syed Naquib al-Attas, then
professor of Malay Studies at the National University of Malaysia;’ Chandra Muzaffar,
Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, p. 54, n. 23.
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political circles he is well received thanks to his mixed Malay-Arabic
ancestry, his aristocratic background and his intimate links to the early
founders of  the dominant Malay conservative UMNO party. He was,
in other words, clearly an establishment figure and his institute (ISTAC)
was firmly located at the centre of  the government’s network of  Islamic
research and academic institutes. From his interest in Sufism al-Attas
developed a complex philosophy of Islamic education which laid great
emphasis on the role of  order and scriptural authority. Critical observers
have suggested that this may explain both the appeal of  al-Attas to
the Malaysian political establishment as well as his following among a
legion of enamoured Malay-Muslim scholars and student-activists, all
of which contributes further to the cult of personality surrounding the
man.36
The philosophy of al-Attas can be summarised as follows: Like
Khomeini, al-Attas regards Islam as a complete, totalised, exclusive
and unique system of belief and thought. It is, for him, the sole religion
which possesses a ‘salvatic mission’ and the only one with truly
universalistic claims.37 Islam has therefore nothing to learn from other
belief and value systems, and Muslims must reject the relativisation
of values and beliefs which has become en vogue of late thanks to the
scourge of  Western secularism. Secularism, on al-Attas’s terms, is
fundamentally a product of  the Western historical experience.38 Thus
from the outset it is presented as something alien to the Muslim world
–––––––––––––––––
36 See: Mona Abaza, Rethinking the Social Knowledge of Islam: Critical Explorations
in the Islamisation of Knowledge Debate between Malaysia and Egypt, unpublished Doctoral
thesis for the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, Berlin, 1998, esp. Chapter 6, pp. 85-107.
37 Al-Attas argues that of the three main Semitic religions (Judaism, Christianity
and Islam), it is Islam that possesses a ‘salvatic impulse’ to save the rest of  humanity.
Judaism, and to a lesser extent, Christianity, are fundamentally tribal religions limited
to a select people while the message of  Islam is open to all. (Ironically, al-Attas later
goes on to attack what he calls the de-Arabisation of  Islam by secular Muslims, p. 127).
Likewise, Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism and other Chinese beliefs are not guided
by salvatic missionary impulses. These are also nation-based collective belief systems
for him (pp. 98-99).
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and the Muslim mind.
For al-Attas Secularism is a Western and eurocentric belief  and
value system which confines human existence to the level of the
profane, material and physical world. It has been one of the tools used
by the West in its war against Islam and its effort to ‘de-Islamize’ Muslim
intellectuals.39 Western secularism leads in turn to the promotion of
secular (Western) sciences and knowledge such as biology, physics,
anthropology and the humanist sciences.40 It promotes humanism and
positivism as the benchmarks of  epistemological certainty and Truth.
These ‘lesser’ or ‘lower’ knowledges then contribute to what al-Attas
calls the ‘levelling’ of the (Muslim) mind, which creates the impression
–––––––––––––––––
38 Al-Attas insists that ‘the major problems that beset Muslim society today
must be understood against the background of  historical confrontation which Western
culture and civilisation had perpetuated against Islam’ (p. 87). He argues that secularism,
as developed within the West, has become one of  the major intellectual and cultural
tools used by the West to undermine the integrity of  the Muslim mind and the faith of
the Muslims: ‘the problems (of Muslims) are caused through the introduction of
Western ways of  thinking and judging and believing emulated by some Muslim scholars
and intellectuals who have been unduly influenced by the West and overawed by its
scientific and technological achievements’ (p. 15).
39 Syed Naguib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, (Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia
Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 1978), p. 16 and also: pp. 124-126.
40 Al-Attas condemns the pervasive spread of  secularism among Muslim
intellectuals via the humanist sciences that they have learnt from their western teachers
thus: ‘The secular scholars and intellectuals among the Muslims derive their aspirations
mainly from the West. Ideologically the belong to the same line of  modernist
‘reformers’… The secular scholars and intellectuals among us refuse to listen and pay
attention (to Islamic teachers) but hang instead upon every word taught by their western
masters in the various branches of the knowledge of the sciences, particularly in that
branch known as the human sciences.’ (pp. 124-125). Elsewhere he attacks these various
schools of humanist knowledge as being fundamentally limited, inferior and antithetical
to the spirit and philosophy of  Islam: ‘In de-Islamizing the Muslims, the Western
administrators and colonial theorists have first severed the pedagogical link between
the Holy Qur’an and the local language by establishing a system of secular education. At
the higher levels linguistics and anthropology are introduced as the methodological
tools for the study of  language and culture, and Western values, models and Orientalist
scholarship and philology for the study of  literature and history.’ (p. 126). These
humanistic sciences, for al-Attas, are all mainly directed towards humanising the outlook
of Muslims and to de-sacralise their religion and worldview so that they in turn adopt
a secular outlook on life as well.
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that all knowledge and truth is relative, contingent, historically and
culturally specific and arbitrary.41
The effect of  Western-inspired and Western-directed
secularisation is that it has brought about a state of total moral and
epistemological confusion in the Muslim world. Muslims no longer
lived in a God-centred universe as soon as they receive their knowledge
(and doctorates) from the West. They have become confused about
their true purpose in life, their obligations and priorities as well as the
social and cultural hierarchies that once governed the universe of
Muslims the world over.42 While great men of  learning once governed
Muslim society, Muslims are now being ruled by technocrats and
politicians instead. While Muslims once lived in an artistic and cultural
milieu of their own, the Muslim world of belle-lettres is now taken over
by hacks from the world of common journalism of the awamm (masses)
instead. And worse of all, while at one time savants of scholarly vision
and purpose (like Naquib al-Attas himself, presumably) once enjoyed
the status of  illuminati and guides to rulers and peasants alike, this
coveted role has now been handed over to lesser academics schooled
in Western political science, economics and other such vulgar disciplines
of  the bazaar. It is hardly a surprise that the homesick Malaysian Muslim
students who were longing for a return to the prestine golden age of
Islam found a welcoming port in the Utopian writings of  al-Attas.
Al-Attas’s attack on ‘secular’ and ‘Europeanised’ (re: Western
trained or educated) intellectuals and political leaders in the Muslim
world falls back on his own (Western) military training43 and employs
the metaphors of  battlefields and troop movements. In his polemic
against these insidious ‘agents of  Western secularism’, al-Attas only
–––––––––––––––––
41 Syed Naguib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, p. 129.
42 Al-Attas contends that ‘In respect of the individual, the confusion in knowledge
(caused by secularism) creates in him an overweening sort of individualism: he thinks
himself the equal of others who are in reality superior to him, and cultivates the
immanent arrogance and obstinacy and tends to reject authority’, (p. 108).
43 It must be remembered that Syed Naquib al-Attas was actually trained at the
Sandhurst Military Academy in Britain. He later received the King’s commission and
served in the Royal Malay Regiment of  the Malayan armed forces and took part in the
military campaign against the communists during the Emergency of 1948-1960.
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stops short of calling them heretics in the eyes of Islam:
(They) have, because of  their influential positions in Muslim society,
become conscious or unconscious disseminators of unnecessary
confusion and ignorance’44
…They have all become conscious or unconscious agents of  Western
culture and civilisation, and in this capacity they represent what we
have identified as the external sources of our Muslim dilemma. But
their existence among us as part of the community creates for us the
situation where what was once regarded as the external has now moved
in methodically and systematically to become internal. In their present
condition they pose as the external menace which has become a grave
internal problem, for intellectually, dar al-harb has advanced within dar-
al-Islam; they have become the enemy within’.45
Like all the Islamist thinkers and activists before him, al-Attas
longs for the restoration of his vision of pure and original Islam, shorn
of  all contaminating traces of  Europe and the West. Echoing the ideas
of  Hassan al-Banna (the founder of  the Ikhwan’ul Muslimin of  Egypt),
al-Attas believes in the creation of an intellectual and political
leadership made up of  spiritually inclined rulers. “The men of
intellectual and spiritual discernment and virtue, the savants, saints
and sages.”46 After unleashing his polemics against all and sundry, al-
Attas prescribes his own unique solution to what he regards as the
malaise of  the modern Malays. His call for a return to the fundamentals
of adab (social customs) invariably betrays the scriptural
authoritarianism and intellectual elitism that lies at the heart of his
entire educational and political philosophy. Having attacked the
institution of  modern (re. Western) politics and Liberal Democracy,
al-Attas proposes that the leadership of Muslim society should go to
those who ‘possess the intellectual, spiritual and linguistic prerequisites
of  Islamic knowledge and epistemology’47 and who should not ‘be
denied their rightful place to lead’48. The socio-political order that al-
Attas envisages is certainly not a democratic or egalitarian one, but
–––––––––––––––––
44 Syed Naguib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, p. 16.
45 Ibid., p. 128; italics ours.
46 Ibid., p. 124.
47 Ibid., p. 124.
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one founded instead on his notion of an ideal Islamic society founded
and shaped by a conservative reading of  adab, where ‘knowledge and
being are ordered hierarchically’.49
Bearing in mind the conservatism and elitism that is clearly
evident in the writings and ideas of Syed Naquib al-Attas, one can see
precisely how and why such a thinker would be useful and appealing
to the conservative leadership of  a party like UMNO and the
technocrats of a modern state like Malaysia.
But the ideas of  al-Attas also had an enormous appeal for a
whole generation of Malaysian Muslim youth who were returning from
their studies abroad, disillusioned with the broken promises of the
West. He had overturned the violent hierarchies of  classical Orientalist
discourse (something he learnt while at SOAS, presumably) against
the very same people who produced it. While Western Orientalists
had configured non-Europeans in terms of  what they lacked (rationality,
modernity, progress), al-Attas had done the reverse by characterising
Europe in terms of  what it lacked (and what Islam possessed in
abundance), namely order, discipline, morality, tradition, honoured
customs, purity and spirituality. By repositioning Islam at the centre
of an Islamocentric worldview the way he did, al-Attas had placed
London, Paris and New York at the margins of  a new world order
whose star was on the rise. For thousands of  young Malaysian and
non-Malaysian students, al-Attas’s grand project of  reconstructing
Islamic knowledge anew (complete with an epistemology and
genealogy it could call its own) seemed to be the antidote to the social
ills of  the West (and the ‘Westernised’ East).
Yet ironically, the rise of  Syed Naquib al-Attas, Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad and the Islamists of  PAS, ABIM and the other Islamist
movements in the country would not have been possible without the
experience of  migration and encounter with the West. For it was the
experience of  going to Europe that provided the conservative
nationalists and Islamists of Malaysia with the discursive raw material
for the anti-Western polemics that they later produced.
–––––––––––––––––
48 Ibid., p. 129.
49 Ibid., p. 105.
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The Malaysian Muslim students who returned from Europe (and
the United States) from the 1970s onwards were a different breed
altogether. They were convinced that the European system was no
longer a model worthy of emulation and that the future no longer
belonged to the West. It was their experience of  living, studying and
meeting other Muslim students in the West that convinced them that
there was another world- the Muslim world- that was presently in a
state of flux and crisis, but which could nonetheless be redeemed and
reconstructed. The political upheavals that took place in North Africa,
Palestine, the Arab world, South and Southeast Asia then also
contributed to the feeling of  frustration, anger and disillusionment
that was soon directed towards the West and their own Westernised
elites back home. By the 1970s and 1980s, these students had
themselves become part of the political, bureaucratic and economic
elite back in their home countries. Their Islamist outlook and openness
to Islamist ideas created the conditions that were ripe for a second
revival of Islamism on their own shores- and the developments in
Malaysia from 1981 onwards serves as a classic case study of  this at
work.
E. Conclusion: The Ambivalent ‘West’ in the Psycho-Social
Drama of Homesickness and Homecoming
The first part of this paper was meant to challenge and debunk
the notion that travel and communication were and are somehow ‘novel’
to the Muslim world. There is absolutely nothing that would back up
such a claim, though there are still many scholars who sadly continue
to evoke the trope of the static Muslim community for the sake of the
dramas that they wish to have played out in their own analyses of
Muslim society, culture, history and politics. I have argued that travel
to the rest of the Muslim world has always been part of ordinary Muslim
life for the Malays of  the archipelago, and that this process was only
brought to a halt due to political circumstances and developments that
were beyond their control.
Travel to the West however (and to Western Europe in particular)
was of special importance for successive generations of Malay-Muslim
political elites and scholars, for whom the idea of European civilisation
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was equated with all that was progressive, advanced, civilised, rational
and universal. Up to the mid-20th century, many Malay-Muslim political
leaders, scholars and intellectuals still believed that the West stood for
a host of  positive values and ideals.
This idealised image of  the West was effectively shattered by
the 1960s and 1970s, and its fall from grace was occasioned by the
emergence of new schools of critical thought both within and without
Europe itself. Even more ironic was the fact that it was the internal
critique within Europe (which began in the 1960s) that helped to open
the way for the emergence and entry of Islamism on the political scene
both in the local and international context. As the limits to Europe’s
own claims to universality were challenged and contested from within
and without, the possibility of precluding any other alternative claims
to universal knowledge and truth was lost.
However, it is important to note that with the decentring of
Europe, the non-European world has itself been grappling with the
challenge of inventing its own discourse of identity which has often
taken a turn towards essentialism and the politics of  authenticity. This
holds true for the emergence of  Islamism as an alternative anti-European
discourse as well. And it is important to note, as Sayyid (1997) does,
that ‘while Islamism is based on the possibility of  decentring the West’
and that it is ‘suspicious of meta-narratives that it considers to be
Western’, the discourse of  Islamism itself  has “been presented with all
the certainly of yet another meta-narrative. The content of Islamist
discourses is replete with grand claims and essentialist categories
marshalled in an uncompromising absolutist language.”50 This as we
have seen was clearly the case in the writings of  Malaysia’s own arch-
Islamist ideologue, Syed Naquib al-Attas.
Thus while Islamism may seem to share some family
resemblances (to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase) with the discourses of
post-modernity and deconstruction, we cannot forget the fact that it
attempts to speak from a fixed position outside the orbit of  the West
which is nonetheless a privileged (and central) position of its own.
Islamist students, activists and intellectuals may have been happy to
–––––––––––––––––
50 Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear, pp. 117-118.
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rely upon the tools of  deconstruction and critical theory as a means to
undermine the universalism and centrality of  the West, but they were
certainly not prepared to use the same tools to radically interrogate
their own beliefs and worldview.
Throughout this long and epic story between East and West,
Islam and Secularism, the idea of  ‘The West’ has played a pivotal role
in the drama of  homesickness and homecoming. It has, as I have tried
to show, been a major idea that helped to shape the discourse of
nationalism and Islamism in Malaysia. The fact that it was Western
Europe (and not East Asia, Africa, Latin America or Australasia) that
figured so prominently in this discourse of desire and repulsion is hardly
an accident or coincidence either. Malaysia’s complex and problematic
relationship with Europe (and Britain in particular) was rooted in very
real (and unequal) relations of power, dominance and dependency which
the former initially accepted but came to reject soon after. The
circumstances that led to this about-turn were, as I have shown, beyond
the control of  both sides. Malaysia and Europe were swept along with
the rest of the world by the stronger currents of anti-colonialism, anti-
imperialism and Islamic resurgence during the 1960s and 1970s.
Despite the vehemently anti-Western outlook that many of  the
1970s and 1980s generation harbour till today, the ‘West’ was, and
remains, the vital constitutive ingredient that gives this form of  radical
Islamism its unity of purpose. Europe today still figures prominently
in the popular political discourse of Malaysians and the Malay-Muslims
in particular. The rise of  political Islam in Malaysia (evident in the
growing popularity and electoral appeal of the Islamist opposition party
PAS and the state’s own move towards the Islamist register) betrays
the constant need for a constitutive Other that serves as the instrumental
fiction which lends coherence to the Islamist project. The ‘West’, which
prided itself for the ‘gifts’ that it once bestowed on the ‘less civilised’
nations and peoples who came under its dominance, now finds itself
playing the role of  the reluctant benefactor once again. For the apparent
(and over-stated) ‘failure’ of  the ‘West’ has been taken as a gift by
those who once stood at the margins of its order of knowledge and
power. And the bearers of  these ‘gifts’ are none other than the successive
generations of Malay-Muslim students who have travelled all the way
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to the ‘West’, only to reaffirm their own beliefs in themselves, what
they have lost and what they seek to regain.
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